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I. Introduction 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has come under increasing criticism in recent years 
for internal contradictions in policy. For example, it is maintained by Stiglitz (2002a, p.107) 
that policies that are prescribed by the Fund to improve economic performance often have just 
the opposite effect on the economy. According to Edwards (1998), the world needs a major 
redesign of the international monetary system by abolishing the IMF -- which is viewed as 
reactive rather than proactive -- and create new institutions with the mandate and ability to 
help prevent major, generalized and costly financial crises. There is also concern that the 
Fund’s policies may not be sufficiently alert to problems of increases in poverty, leading to 
avoidable political problems in economic restructuring.1 For example, the head count ratio of 
poverty increased by 140 per cent in Indonesia between "mid-1997 and early 1999", when the 
country was under IMF supervision following a major financial crisis affecting much of East 
Asia (Chand 2003).2 Another criticism is that the Fund may contribute to moral hazard in 
borrowing and lending, because it is perceived as being able to arrange lending at the last 
resort, and encourage risky behaviour by borrowers and private creditors in advance of crises 
(Joyce, 2002).   
 
The weight of the arguments underlying above criticisms is that long term dependence on 
IMF prescriptions is harmful for the economic prospects of client states. The purpose of this 
paper is not to evaluate the arguments, but to examine whether the financial markets also take 
a pessimistic view of the efficacy of IMF prescriptions. We approach this question by 
examining the effect of IMF imprimatur on the cost of borrowing in the international capital 
markets by private and public sector entities located in client states, and comparing the costs 
for borrowers from countries that have not approached the IMF for assistance, despite the fact 
that they are also experiencing financial difficulties similar to those of the above client states.  
 
                                                          
1 Even the policymakers in the IMF have began to realise the need to address the political economy of income 
distribution, if re-structuring is to be successful in ameliorating balance of payments constraints on growth.  
However, the level of understanding of these issues within the IMF may not be adequate, as observed in a report 
by the Independent Evaluation Unit of the IMF (IMF, 2002)  
 
2 The distributional effects of IMF programmes appear to depend on an indebted country's level of per capita 
income at the time of entry under the IMF umbrella. The poor in countries which have lower per capita income 
become poorer faster than their counterparts in countries with higher per capita income after imbibing IMF 
prescriptions (Grauda, 2000). Another interesting feature of income distribution is that the labour's share of 
income is lower in countries under IMF programmes than in other countries with similar per capita income 
(Vreeland, 2002). 
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It is indeed the case that countries which have a history of debt re-scheduling find it more 
expensive to borrow money in the capital markets (Eichengreen and Mody 2000; Ozler 1993).  
Some of these countries may approach the IMF for assistance following a period of financial 
difficulty. Any assistance that is provided is conditional on an agreement from the recipient 
country to revise economic policies to obtain a seal of approval from the IMF. An expectation 
is that the financial markets would respond by making more credit available, and on terms 
that are more favourable, than would otherwise be the case. The literature does not provide 
systematic empirical evidence as to whether the above expectation is fulfilled. The literature 
simply suggests that a country in receipt of assistance from the IMF finds it more expensive to 
borrow in the private markets than developing countries in general (Altunbas and Gadanecz 
2003).  
 
Presumably the decision to seek assistance from the IMF is perceived as a harbinger of 
"potential problems in the economy" (Altunbas and Gadanecz 2003). It may also be the case 
that private lenders may be engaging in riskier projects in counties under the IMF's umbrella 
in the expectation of a bailout by the Fund in case of default. However, these are not the only 
plausible explanations. It may also be the case that there is reluctance on the part of private 
lenders to put faith in the efficacy of IMF prescriptions. This particular line of investigation 
entails a comparison of IMF-assisted developing countries with a subset of other developing 
countries that are also faced with similar balance of payments problems but with one 
difference. They have eschewed IMF assistance. The object of this paper is to carry out an 
investigation using a large dataset of lending contracts of the effect of the IMF stamp of 
approval on the price of loans.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly reviews the literature on the increasing 
involvement of the IMF in the emerging markets when these markets run into financial 
difficulties. Section III outlines the salient features of the dataset used in our study, and 
explains our methodology. In Section IV the results are discussed and Section V concludes by 
summarising the findings. 
 
II. IMF Policies:  The Background 
 
The International Monetary Fund was originally set up with a mandate to provide assistance 
to member countries facing short-term problems in the foreign exchange markets 
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(Goldsbrough et al, 2002). Help was available to both developing and industrialised nations 
alike. But in recent years the Fund has become increasingly active in long term development 
policies. During 1971-2000, 29 countries out of 128 borrowers were prolonged users3 and 
another 15 were very prolonged users (IMF 2002)4. Stiglitz (2002b) argues that the mandate 
of the IMF, to provide liquidity to countries facing temporary economic downturn, is at 
variance with the task into which the Fund has allowed itself to be drawn. In consequence, the 
Fund's prescriptions, based on its traditional approach to short term problems with currencies, 
are often ill-advised. Short term problems in the balance of payments can sometimes be 
addressed through contractionary fiscal policies, but the response to structural imbalance in an 
economy requires an understanding of development policy. Critics argue that the Fund does 
not have that understanding and thus it resorts to prescriptions that may, at best, work to 
smooth out short term difficulties in the balance of payments. The consequence is that these 
policies are counter-productive for making the economic adjustments needed for economic 
growth (Stiglitz 2002a).  For example, a study by Prezeworski and Vreeland (2000) reveals 
that participation to IMF programs lowers growth rates for these countries as long as they 
remain under a program. 
 
The critics can be grouped into three categories.  The first group argues that the Fund does not 
appreciate the need to reconcile conflicting political tensions in the design of economic 
policy. Thus the policies that are prescribed are not always feasible to implement properly.  
The second group argues that the Fund's policies lead to greater financial instability. Finally, 
there are those who focus on the moral hazard entailed in borrowing under the aegis of the 
Fund. All the three groups of critics conclude that the embrace of the IMF is not conducive to 
long term prosperity. These arguments are outlined below, but without critical evaluation of 
their relative merit. Our objective is simply to examine if the financial markets, in their loan 
pricing decisions, place faith in the critics or in the IMF. 
 
i. Political economy  
 
Easterly (2003) investigated the impact of various structural adjustment programs and 
reported that such programs lower the impact of economic fluctuations on poverty, i.e., 
economic expansions following these adjustments benefits the poor less but contractions 
                                                          
3 Prolonged users are defined as countries engaged in IMF-supported programs for at least 7 years out of any 10. 
4 Very prolonged users are defined as countries engaged in IMF-supported programs for 15 or more years. 
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resulting from structural adjustment also hurt the poor less.  According to Goldsbrough et al 
(2002), one possible explanation as to why these policies fail to deliver growth is the linkage 
of aid to the acceptance of IMF supported programmes. The linkage raises the stakes at 
program negotiations to the point of putting strong pressure on both the country authorities 
and the IMF to reach an agreement, even though both parties may have doubts about the 
program's feasibility. The quality of the seal of approval is thus compromised by the pressure 
to reach an agreement. 
 
Another aspect of the above idea, that the quality of IMF programs is diluted due to political 
exigencies of the process of reaching decisions, is examined by Gould (2003). The Fund itself 
provides only a fraction of the amount of money that a country needs to bring its external 
account into balance, and also to implement the economic policies recommended by the Fund. 
The IMF relies on supplementary external financing to ensure the success of its programmes. 
This gives the supplementary financiers leverage over the design of the Fund's programmes. 
Too many contradictory pressures are faced in the design of policy, and the result is less 
coherent than it might be otherwise.  
 
ii. Financial instability 
 
Another argument made by critics is that IMF programmes often entail the type of financial 
liberalisation that causes greater fluctuations in short-term capital inflows and outflows, 
thereby leading to greater volatility in the financial markets in the developing countries (Kas 
2003, Rodrik 1998, Stiglitz 2000 and 2003). Kohler (2003) at IMF categorizes the volume 
and complexity of these flows and explains why they raise concern about, what he calls, crises 
vulnerability.  
 
A more favourable view of these short term flows is taken by those who believe that the 
IMF's seal of approval encourages the flow of capital into activities that enhance the 
allocative efficiency of finance capital. An IMF-approved loan programme, according to this 
view, serves as a good housekeeping seal of approval, increasing the creditworthiness of 
debtor countries and provoking an automatic inflow of outside financing. Marchesi and 
Thomas (2000) finds evidence that the presence of an IMF program serves as a signalling 
device of a country’s willingness and ability to undertake substantive reform. Private creditors 
are then more willing to reschedule the country's external debt. However, this alleged 
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catalytic effect on private capital inflow is not observed. It is reported in the literature that 
there is surprisingly little evidence that IMF lending to a country was followed by an increase 
in private credit flows (Bird and Rowlands 1997, Ergin 1999, Edwards 2000, Rowlands 2001, 
Joyce 2002). The literature in the above genre seldom considers the cost of credit, an omission 
that is addressed in our paper, when monies are raised in the international capital markets, and 
instead focuses on the size of the private capital inflow. 
 
iii. Moral Hazard 
 
Finally, there is concern about moral hazard when private institutions are brought under the 
umbrella of the IMF to design and implement economic reform. According to Ann Krueger, 
the deputy managing director of the IMF (Krueger 2001), private institutions may be 
encouraged to lend and invest more recklessly due to belief that the Fund will ensure that 
debtors can repay the loans. 
 
The literature analyzes the concept of moral hazard from two perspectives, moral hazard by 
creditors and moral hazard by debtors. Suppose that creditors refuse to roll over maturing debt 
in a debt-distressed country working with the IMF. The Fund, fearing that the creditors' action 
could spark off a financial crisis and impose additional cost on the country and also on the 
credibility of the IMF, may provide extra resources that can be used to finance creditors’ exit. 
Creditors may anticipate such a response, that the Fund would bail them out in case the 
borrower defaults. Therefore, creditors may allocate resources with less concern about project 
risk, thus increasing the possibility of the emergence of future crises in borrowing countries 
(Dreher 2004).  Recent studies have focused on Mexican, East Asian and Russian crises to 
find evidence of moral hazard (Zhang 1999, Eichengreen and Mody 2000, Tillmann 2001, 
Evrensel 2002, Dell’Arricia, Schnabel and Zettelmeyer 2002, Kamin 2002). The literature is 
not unanimous about the precise impact of IMF policies on the moral hazard in lending and 
borrowing. 
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III. Data and Methodology 
 
i. Data 
 
We have a sample of over 10 thousand syndicated credit facilities granted to public and 
private sector borrowers in developing countries between 1993 and 2001. There are in excess 
of 6800 single deals in this dataset. From this data, a total number of 2,665 loan contracts are 
extracted for the study. These contracts are identified as pertaining to countries that are facing 
serious balance of payments problems.  These 2,665 contracts are then broken down into two 
sub-samples. The first sub-sample of 1,580 credit facilities pertain to countries which have 
availed of IMF assistance by operating the General Resources Account (GRA). The second 
sub-sample containing 1,085 loan accounts pertain to countries that have also experienced 
similar intensity of balance of payments problems as the first group of countries, but there is a 
difference. Unlike the first group of debt-distressed countries, this second sub-sample 
comprise countries that have not sought to operate the General Resources Account. They have 
not called upon the IMF for assistance.5 The above two groups of emerging countries selected 
for the study are described in Appendix 1.  A comparison of the debt intensity indicators of 
the two sample groups can be found below in the section entitled Descriptive Statistics on 
Country Basis. 
 
Each of the above loan contracts identifies the microeconomic variables and the country from 
which the loan application originates. For example, above data tell us what the loans were for, 
whether they were for the construction of infra-structure, for general corporate purposes or for 
specific project finance. Some of the state borrowers are identified as such, but the contracts 
are not clearly demarcated between borrowing by state and private sector entities. The full set 
of codes listing the purposes of the loans is given in Appendix 1.  Macroeconomic data for 
periods relevant for the contracts are mostly obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics and World Economic Outlook, which are both published by the IMF. Some of the 
data are gathered from the BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Joint Statistics on external debt.  
 
The price of loans in the literature is defined as the spread charged over LIBOR, EURIBOR 
or similar pricing references used by international lenders (Cantor and Packer 1996, Kamin 
and von Kleist 1999, Kleimeier and Megginson 2000). We use a more inclusive concept of 
                                                          
5 In subsequent pages, we talk about two samples to denote the two sub-samples described above.  
 8 
loan price, the Drawn Return, which is based on the full economic cost of borrowing. It is the 
annual return that will accrue to a senior fund provider if the facility is drawn for the entire 
period of its existence. It includes the spread as above, but it also counts the fees payable for 
utilisation, participation, provision of facility and underwriting.  
 
ii. Descriptive Statistics on Country Basis 
 
The two groups of countries that are compared here, one that is under the aegis of the IMF 
and the other that has not sought assistance from the IMF, have similar levels of debt-to-GDP 
and Short-term debt to total debt. Table 1 below provides a more formal comparison, 
employing a T-test on the differences of the mean values.  
 
 Table 1 
Mean debt intensity indicators of emerging countries with and without IMF 
assistance between 1993-2001* 
  IMF assistance Non-IMF assistance 
Debt to GDP 38.95 41.05 
Short-term debt to total debt 48.06 45.52 
   
T-Test for mean difference P-Value Significance 
Debt to GDP 0.742 Not significant 
Short-term debt to total debt 0.425 Not significant 
   Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
 
A more detailed comparison between the two sets of countries can be made by reference to 
the charts below. Trends in the debt-to-GDP ratios are compared in Chart 1.  In 1993, this 
ratio for countries seeking IMF assistance was around 17%, but the corresponding figure for 
the second group of countries was around 25%.  By the end of the data period, in 2001, the 
position is reversed. The IMF-assisted countries are in a worse position. 
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A similar pattern can also be observed in Chart 2 for the ratio of short term debt to total debt. 
The two groups had similar short term to debt levels, around 51%, in 1993.  At the end of the 
period in 2001, although both groups had been successful in reducing the ratio, the countries 
that were assisted by the IMF were less successful in reducing the ratio.  
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The above patterns are also repeated when the ratio of debt service payment to export income 
is examined in Chart 3. 
Chart 1:  Debt to GDP ratios of the two samples,  with and without IMF assistance, 
between 1993 and 2001  
Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
Chart 2:  Short term debt to total debt ratios of the two samples, with and 
without IMF assistance between 1993 and 2001  
Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
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The gap between non IMF and IMF countries was around 15% at the beginning of the period 
and then the gap increased to around 25% at the end of it.  A country's export performance, 
income from the outside world, is an indicator of how effectively it can repay its foreign debt.  
As mentioned above, non IMF countries managed to decrease their debt relative to GDP6 and 
increase their export income, while IMF assisted countries failed to do so.  The characteristics 
of the loan contracts can be gleaned from Table 2 below. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on loan characteristics for the two samples, with and without IMF 
assistance (1993-2001) 
Countries with IMF assistance 
Variable No of observations Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
drawn (basis points) 1580 226 151 2.38 1275 
maturity (year) 1580 3.98 3.69 0.1 30 
loan size ($ million) 1580 126 211 0 6100 
      
Countries without IMF assistance 
Variable No of observations Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
drawn (basis points) 1085 125 98 7 1000 
maturity (year) 1085 4.97 3.11 0.1 25 
loan size ($ million) 1085 104 168 0.02 3500 
    Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
 
                                                          
6 Either because they have decreased their debt or they have increased their GDP.  In any case this indicates an 
economic progress in the country. 
Chart 3:  Debt service to exports of good and services ratios of the two samples, 
with and without IMF assistance between 1993 and 2001  
Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
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Average Drawn Return for the first sub-sample of emerging countries, those with IMF 
assistance, is 226 basis points, some 101 basis points above the corresponding figure for the 
second sample comprising of countries that are not seeking IMF assistance.  The loan size is 
US$ 22 million higher on average in favour of countries with IMF assistance, but the maturity 
of an average non-IMF country syndicated loan is 1 year longer. At first glance, IMF assisted 
countries seem to pay higher price for the loans even though they are borrowing shorter term.  
On the other hand IMF assisted countries appear to obtain larger loans. 
 
iii. Descriptive Statistics on Business Sector and Loan Purpose 
 
The data allow us to carry our analysis one step further to look at loans at the microeconomic 
level, to be able to compare the two groups according to the borrower's business sector and 
according to the purpose of each loan commitment7.  Chart 1 provides an indication of the 
sectoral composition of loans. We note that around 35% of syndicated loans in the IMF 
assisted countries are granted to financial services industries, while the corresponding figure 
is only 16 per cent in the non-assisted sample.  One notable aspect of the data is that banks 
appear to be amongst the major customers in the syndicated loan market in countries working 
with the IMF, but the picture is different in countries outside the ambit of the IMF. Table 3 
reveals that, in the latter group of countries, the non-bank financial services sector raises more 
loans in the above market.   
 
In certain cases, in order to be able to attract foreign funds into the economy, governments 
give guarantees to the foreign liabilities of the banking sector in IMF assisted countries8.  
Moral hazard problems arise because international lenders appear to be lending to the 
financial sector often under government guarantee, rather than lending directly to domestic 
enterprises, in countries under IMF program. The financial sector then channels these funds to 
domestic enterprises. There might also be benign cases where domestic banks raise loans in 
the international syndicated loan markets for domestic enterprises which are too small to 
access the international capital markets on their own. 
 
                                                          
7 Different business sectors are group into 7 main categories.  The detailed list is given in Appendix 2. 
8 Such as the cases in Turkey (IMF 2001), Indonesia and Thailand  (IMF 1999).   
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Chart 1:  Sectoral composition of loans issued to the two groups of sample countries,  
with and without IMF assistance  
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Focusing on Table 3, we note that banks in Sample 1 countries, those working with the IMF, 
obtain loans of shorter duration than banks located in the second sample of countries, but we 
do not have adequate evidence to conclude whether it is a supply or demand led phenomenon. 
Moreover, banks in Sample 1 pay more than twice as much spread than their counterparts in 
Sample 2. This difference in the average cost of loans can also be observed for borrowing by 
the non-bank financial services sectors. These loans raised in foreign currency by the financial 
sector are sometimes used to fund the export sector in developing countries.  Our data reveals 
that 15% of loans issued to the bank sector in IMF assisted countries are channelled to export 
industries.  With more expensive and shorter maturity funding, the emerging market 
economies in Sample 1 may become even more vulnerable to financial crises. Their goods 
and services sectors are placed at a disadvantage in the export markets with respect to 
business located in the Sample 2 countries.  
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Drawn 34 246.0 99.4 63.1 475 28 127.7 67.4 42.8 387 
Maturity   4.1 2.6 0.1 15   3.3 1.9 0.5 15 Construction 
and Property Loan 
size   56.1 45.6 0.1 512.1   47.1 53.7 1.2 450.6 
Drawn 361 206.3 155.0 37.5 700 105 102.6 71.1 15 387.5 
Maturity   1.6 1.4 0.2 13   4.3 2.4 0.1 25 
Financial 
Services 
(Bank) Loan 
size   94.2 144.1 1 2022.1   66.1 47.4 1.1 2300 
Drawn 90 236.6 161.7 25 700 104 101.1 49.0 30 300 
Maturity   3.6 3.2 0.3 18   3.5 1.8 0.5 16 
Financial 
Services (Non-
Bank) Loan 
size   86.3 94.4 1.7 560   69.8 79.0 2.5 1050 
Drawn 237 216.1 161.7 2.4 1275 210 149.2 122.2 7 1000 
Maturity   4.2 2.8 0.3 13.5   4.7 2.6 0.2 13.5 High-Tech 
Loan 
size   125.6 169.3 0.2 1750   90.5 95.1 0.3 1900 
Drawn 8 304.9 196.0 80 600 2 125.0 0.0 37 134 
Maturity   5.0 2.5 1 20   12.0 1.4 1 13 Infrastructure 
Loan 
size   114.5 71.4 15 399.5   169.0 15.6 7.9 884.4 
Drawn 72 344.7 182.5 25 750 42 88.3 64.1 45 571.1 
Maturity   3.0 2.0 0.3 10   5.0 2.4 0.9 12 Population 
Services Loan 
size   113.7 163.3 0.4 1100   209.3 293.0 4.5 287 
Drawn 77 201.7 127.6 20 580 44 88.3 64.1 24.3 356.3 
Maturity   4.7 4.3 0.3 17.8   5.0 2.4 0.5 21 State 
Loan 
size   256.6 486.5 1.4 6100   209.3 293.0 2.2 1350 
Drawn 309 241.5 142.9 2.8 700 250 138.9 101.6 15 550 
Maturity   3.9 2.8 0.2 16   5.0 2.5 0.3 15 Traditional 
Industry Loan 
size   113.2 148.4 0 1152   79.6 110.1 0 2416 
Drawn 49 199.6 157.8 2.8 700 50 97.1 64.6 15 550 
maturity   6.9 4.0 0.2 16   8.7 3.4 0.3 15 Transportation 
loan size   93.7 98.2 0 1152   79.6 81.5 0 2416 
    Note:  Drawn are basis points, Loan size are million US dollars, Maturity year   
    Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
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Another observation is that the size of loans that the state sector obtains in the IMF supported 
countries is larger on average9. Lenders appear not to hesitate to fund the state and 
government institutions in countries working with the IMF with larger sized loans, but 
charging them twice as much for loans issued to the state sector in countries outside the IMF 
umbrella, admittedly for smaller amounts.  In both the sets of countries, a significant fraction 
of the funds obtained from syndicated loan markets is used for export industry financing.  In 
IMF assisted countries export financing loans constitute 34 per cent of all loans taken out by 
the state sector while in the sample of non assisted countries this ratio amounts to 55 per cent.  
Once again, as in the case of banking sector borrowing, these higher costs of borrowing may 
place the IMF-assisted countries at a disadvantage in the export markets when competing with 
their peers 
 
In all sectors, with the exception of high tech industries, borrowers from countries under the 
aegis of the IMF pay at least 100 basis more over LIBOR than their peers. The maximum 
difference is 256 basis points, more than twice the amount paid by their peers, in Population 
Services10.  Lending contracts issued to entities located in countries under the IMF umbrella 
are for shorter duration than those issued to entities located in the second sample of countries, 
those that are not in an IMF programme.  In particular, the maturity period for loans issued to 
the banking sector of the two groups differs significantly.  Thus the IMF's imprimatur appears 
to be associated with larger loans, but for shorter duration and at a higher cost. If this is 
supply driven, then it suggests a remarkably cautious approach by international bankers, 
perhaps signalling lack of confidence in the efficacy of IMF programs and economic policy 
advice. A similar picture about the cost of funds emerges from an examination of the data for 
project finance (See descriptive statistics by loan purposes in Table 6, Appendix 3). Funds 
borrowed for project finance are more expensive in the IMF supported countries.  
 
iv. Methodology - Loan Pricing and Developing Country Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
Loan pricing decisions are based on the purpose of the loan and the macroeconomic 
environment of the country. There are only a few published studies that focus on the effect of 
macro economic indicators of a country on the pricing of loans and bonds raised by entities 
resident in the country. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) is an important contribution to this 
                                                          
9 It should be noted that our data do not allow all state borrowings to be identified as such. Some of the contracts 
do not specify whether the borrower is a state enterprise or a private enterprise. 
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literature. We modify their approach in being able to draw on a larger set of data: there are 
more contracts and richer details concerning these contracts.  
 
Edwards (1986) studies the effects of certain macro-economic variables on spreads for the 
developing country foreign borrowing11  using a data set consisting of 900 Eurocurrency bank 
loans granted to developing countries between 1976 and 1980.  He finds that countries with 
high debt to GNP ratio pay higher prices for loans. This conclusion is strengthened with the 
finding that a higher debt service to exports ratio significantly leads to higher loan prices, but 
growth rate of the country does not appear to have a significant effect on loan prices. The 
ratio of gross investment to GNP is found to have a negative impact on the spread, indicating 
that the level of the country risk premium is affected by the way in which the borrowed funds 
are spent. International liquidity (measured by the ratio of reserves to GNP) held by a country 
appears to play no significant role in the determination of the country risk premium. Finally, 
both maturity and loan size are reported to have a negative relation with loan spreads in 
emerging-market borrowing.12 
 
Ozler (1993) investigates the impact of borrowers’ repayment history on credit-market access 
and prices of loans.  She employs a data set comprising 1,525 commercial bank loan contracts 
raised from Eurocurrency credit markets by entities resident in 26 emerging countries during 
the 1968-1981 periods.  Unlike Edwards above, she finds that a higher real GNP growth rate 
pushes up the cost of borrowing. There is also another difference. She finds that longer term 
loans are more costly. Like Edwards, Ozler also employs a dummy variable for IMF presence 
in the borrowing emerging country and finds a positive relationship with loan spreads with an 
estimated impact of 30 basis points. She also examines the cost of foreign borrowing when 
the ratio of reserves to GNP is increased. There is an inverse relationship.  
 
Ozler and Edwards report contradictory effect of growth rates and maturity of loans on the 
cost of borrowing. Using a larger sample of just over five thousand syndicated loans 
containing richer information about the individual contracts, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 This sector consists of firms mostly with the main business related to health, legal and leisure services.  A 
more detailed subdivision is given in Appendix 2. 
11 The data are not differentiated between state and private sector borrowing. 
12 Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) analyze syndicated loans between 1980 and 1999 and finds evidence that 
loan size has a negative relationship with pricing while loan maturity significantly and positively related to the 
price.  Regarding to external debt to export ratio effect on bond spreads Cantor and Pecker (1996) finds a 
positive relationship between the two by analyzing 35 Eurodollar bond of debtor countries. Neither of these 
studies makes a distinction between developed and developing nations. 
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clarify the results. Countries with rapid growth and high levels of bank credit pay a higher 
price for their borrowing13. But a country with a high growth rate that also has the ability to 
repay, as measured by exports to debt service ratio, can reduce spreads. They also report that 
the loan spread declines with the amount borrowed and it rises with loan maturity. Entities 
located in countries which have high debt levels (measured by the total debt to GNP ratio), a 
history of debt rescheduling, and a higher debt service obligation in relation to earnings from 
exports, pay higher spreads than comparable entities in other countries.  Low values of the 
ratio of international reserves to short-term debt significantly raise spreads.  A large share of 
short-term debt in the country’s total outstanding bank debt has a strong, positive impact, that 
is also statistically significant, on spreads. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) comes down on the 
side of Edwards (1986) and reports a negative relationship between maturity and loan spreads  
 
Altunbas and Gadanecz (2003) builds on the above study by analysing an even larger data set 
comprising 5,010 syndicated loans granted to both public and private sector entities in 
developing countries between 1993 and 2001. Their findings are similar to those reported in 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000). Altunbas and Gadanecz (2003), like Ozler (1993) before 
them, also controls for the IMF presence, and report that this presence is associated with 
increased cost of borrowing.  None of these studies control for the IMF presence by 
comparing the outcome of IMF presence with the absence of the IMF umbrella for two 
otherwise similar groups of countries. This is done in the present study. 
 
To investigate the determinants of loan prices and to test the effect of the market’s perception 
of the potential value of IMF imprimatur, the following equation is estimated; 
 
impexgdpcpigrowthcredgdpinvgdptdebtst
restogdptdstoxgsdebtgdpmaturityInterceptdrawn
1098765
43210
_
ln
ββββββ
βββββ
+++++
+++++=
 
 
The independent variables are selected from the literature reviewed above, and attention is 
paid to ensure that the explanatory variables capture the measures of solvency, liquidity, 
economic growth and trade openness of the countries under investigation.  
 
                                                          
 
13 Authors explain that as a result of growth rates fuelled by the expansion of domestic credit were viewed by the 
market with a concern. 
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Debt to GDP (debtgdp) and debt service to export of goods and services (tdstoxgs) ratios are 
the two solvency parameters.  High values of these ratios are expected to increase the price of 
loans for borrowers.  International reserves to GDP (restogd) is a liquidity variable. Higher 
reserves to GDP ratio is expected to have a negative impact on the price of foreign loans.  
Short term external debt to total external debt (st_tdeb) ratio is another way of measuring the 
liquidity of borrowers. A high level of short-term debt relative to total debt is expected to 
decrease the creditworthiness of the borrower and increase the cost of borrowing.  The ratio of 
the sum of imports and exports to GDP (impexpgdp) is included in the equation to detect the 
effect of economic openness of a borrowing country on the price of loans.  An economy that 
is more integrated with the world economy is expected to attract lower prices. The Investment 
to GDP (invgdp) ratio, and the rate of inflation (cpi) are included to see if lenders take into 
account expected changes in macroeconomic indicators in the borrower's country. Higher 
investment to GDP might indicate a distressed country’s willingness to improve its economic 
environment. Potential creditors may respond by charging lower loan spreads from LIBOR.  
The Growth rate (growth) and bank credit to GDP (credgdp) ratio and are included to 
measure the economic potential of the country. A higher growth rate is expected to have a 
lessening effect on loan costs.  Finally, as a microeconomic characteristic of each single loan 
deal, maturity is included in the equation to see the effects of long and short term borrowing 
on the price of the loan.  
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
 
The countries in our two samples can be grouped into those that are under the IMF umbrella 
(1,580 loan contracts), and those that are not (1,085 loan contracts). However, both of these 
groups have experienced similar intensity of deficit, as indicated by measures described in 
Table 1, in their balance of payments.  The object is to see if applicants from the former group 
of countries enjoy a lower rate of interest in view of their ability to demonstrate the IMF 
imprimatur.  The results are presented in Table 4.   
 
Maturity is significant in both groups of countries. It is negatively related with price of loans 
in the sample of countries in receipt of IMF assistance and positively related to the price of 
loans in the other sample. This result suggests that entities located in IMF assisted countries 
either have difficulty obtaining long term loans or do not seek long term loans. This result is 
in line with the descriptive statistics presented above in Table 3.  If it is the latter, then the 
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IMF advisors take the view that the role of the IMF is to help tidy over short term problems. 
Since these countries in our sample have remained under the umbrella of the IMF for a very 
long time, this view does not appear to accord with the need for a vision about the long term. 
If it is the case that these countries have less success than those in the other sample outside the 
IMF umbrella in obtaining long term loans, then it would appear that the financial markets do 
not have much confidence in the IMF prescriptions. 
 
Table 4 
Regression results for emerging countries with and without IMF assistance 
  
Emerging countries with IMF 
assistance 
Emerging countries without IMF 
assistance 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P Value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P Value 
Maturity -0.0191 0.0050 0.0000 0.0227 0.0066 0.0010 
Debt to GDP -0.0085 0.0019 0.0000 -0.0063 0.0016 0.0000 
Debt service to export of goods 
and services 0.0013 0.0008 0.1210 0.0119 0.0041 0.0040 
International reserves to GDP 0.0098 0.0064 0.1270 0.0036 0.0040 0.3650 
Short term external debt to total 
external debt -0.0052 0.0022 0.0180 0.0084 0.0030 0.0060 
Investment to GDP -0.0126 0.0053 0.0180 0.0045 0.0063 0.4760 
bank credit to GDP -0.0009 0.0017 0.5770 -0.0012 0.0020 0.5510 
Growth rate -0.0363 0.0054 0.0000 -0.0639 0.0082 0.0000 
Sum of imports and exports to 
GDP -0.0052 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0051 0.0017 0.0020 
Inflation -0.0005 0.0002 0.0240 0.0060 0.0033 0.0670 
Constant 6.8032 0.1741 0.0000 4.7676 0.2265 0.0000 
Note:  Number of observations in drawn spread regression for countries with IMF assistance is 1438, for countries without IMF assistance is 
1030.  F-tests are significant at the 1% level 
 
The first of the two solvency measures, debt to GDP, is significant and negatively related to 
spread in both groups.  This result was not picked up in earlier literature (Eichengreen and 
Mody, 2000; Altunbas and Gadanecz, 2003; Edwards 1986), where the data were not 
partitioned to identify distressed countries that were not under the IMF umbrella. Previous 
studies (eg Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Altunbas and Gadanecz, 2003; Edwards 1986; 
Cantor and Pecker 1996) also appear to indicate that lenders take into consideration the ability 
to service foreign debt by earning money from exports. Our results confirm this finding, but 
for only the second sample, countries that are not under the IMF umbrella. The variable used 
to capture the above ability to service foreign debt is the debt service to exports ratio. This 
coefficient attached to this ratio in our equation is positive and significant, but only for 
countries in the second sample. It appears, however, that export performance in relation to 
debt service obligation is considered less important for countries under IMF supervision and 
we conjecture that perhaps lenders expect to be bailed out by the IMF. 
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Reserve to GDP ratio is insignificant in both groups.  Earlier literature (Edwards, 1986; 
Altunbas and Gadanecz 2003) suggests that the relation between this ratio and price of loans 
is negative. Although the national reserves are taken into account when pricing emerging 
country loans, there are measurement problems, for example in distinguishing between short 
term capital flow and changes in reserves14.  If IMF policies on strengthening foreign 
exchange reserves have an impact on the lender's decision in the pricing of loans to entities 
located in IMF-assisted countries, the impact is difficult to identify15.    
 
The coefficient of short term external debt to total external debt ratio is significant and has a 
positive sign when the regression equation is restricted to sample countries without IMF 
assistance as Edwards (1986) suggests.   In contrast, the coefficient is significant but negative 
in countries with IMF assistance.  This might signal creditor moral hazard, implying that 
creditors do not worry about potential default because they expect to be bailed out by the IMF 
when a borrowing country is under the IMF umbrella.  An alternative but not mutually 
exclusive explanation might lie in the fact, as discussed above, that governments in IMF 
assisted countries guarantee even private sector loans and local banks' foreign liabilities. 
Creditors expect a sovereign country default to be less likely.  
 
Investment to GDP ratio is significant and negatively related to the cost of funds, but only in 
IMF assisted countries.  This finding is similar to that reported in earlier literature (Edwards, 
1986), which suggests that lenders take a more benign view of countries that are expected to 
grow faster. Inflation (CPI) in countries without IMF assistance increases the price of loans.16  
Paradoxically CPI has a significant but negative relation to the price offered to enterprises in 
countries in receipt of IMF assistance. It is possible that larger inflation is also associated with 
larger drop in the inflation rate amongst these countries but the data are not rich enough to test 
this proposition. In any event, the coefficient for CPI is very small. Real GDP growth has a 
significant and negative coefficients in both of the selected groups of countries. This result is 
in accordance with past literature (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Altunbas and Gadanecz, 
2003).  In the eyes of lenders, a vigorously but not too rapidly growing country is regarded as 
                                                          
14   To measure the possible effect of correlation between short-term debt to total debt and reserves to GDP ratio on 
constructed model, we have run a regression for both groups of countries omitting the reserves to GDP variable.  These 
results, reported in Appendix 5, do not much differ from original findings that are presented in Table 4 in the text.   
15   To control the uniformity of higher foreign exchange reserves policy of IMF, we have checked the variability of reserves 
to GDP ratio for both samples.  Standard deviation of debt to GDP ratio is 3.6 and 9.3 per cent, respectively, for the IMF 
assisted and non IMF assisted countries.  The low variance in the first group compared to their peers signals greater 
uniformity in the policy on reserves amongst the IMF-assisted countries.    
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a less risky proposition. A higher level of economic openness, measured by the volume of 
import and exports to GDP, ameliorate debt distressed countries’ cost of funding whether they 
follow IMF prescriptions or not.    
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The IMF has come under increasing criticism in recent years for internal contradictions in 
policy. Questions have been raised about how the international financial markets perceive the 
value of the IMF umbrella for countries that are experiencing financial difficulties. This paper 
tackles this question by examining the effect of IMF imprimatur on the cost of borrowing in 
the international capital markets by client states using a large sample single-syndicated loan 
contracts granted to public and private sector borrowers located in debt distressed emerging 
nations between 1993 and 2001.  The data consist of 2665 loan contracts and this is broken 
down into two samples, both comprising countries experiencing a similar intensity of balance 
of payments deficit. Only one of the sample comprises countries that have availed of IMF 
assistance by operating the General Resources Account (GRA).  
 
The evidence indicates that creditors might not place much faith in the efficacy of IMF 
programs and economic policy advice. The data reveal that the IMF assisted countries paid 
higher spreads over LIBOR for short term loans and obtained fewer long term loan contracts 
compared to their non-IMF peers for the financing of similar purpose projects.  Specifically, 
loans channelled to the export sector either by state or by the financial sector in IMF assisted 
countries are more costly relative to their counterparts in non-assisted countries. Thus the 
goods and services sectors in the non-assisted countries enjoy an advantage in the export 
markets. This might be a plausible explanation of the findings reported in Prezeworski and 
Vreeland (2000) that countries under IMF programmes record a lower growth rates. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 Altunbas and Gadanecz (2003) also finds a positive relation between price and CPI.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1 
Selected emerging countries and total number of syndicated loans issued 
between 1993 and 2001   
Emerging countries with IMF assistance Emerging countries without IMF assistance 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia, Turkey 
Chile, Ghana, India, Morocco, Malaysia, 
Tunisia, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Venezuela 
Total Loans Issued 1677 Total Loans Issued 1177 
       
    Source:  Authors' calculations from data     
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Appendix 2 
 
Construction and property: Construction/Building, Products-Commercial Building, Construction/Building 
Products-Maintenance, Construction/Building  Products-Miscellaneous, Construction/Building Products-
Residential Building, Construction/Building Products-Retail/Wholesale, Property/Real Estate, Property/Real 
Estate-Development, Property/Real Estate-Diversified, Property/Real Estate-Operations, Property/Real Estate-
REIT, Construction/Building. 
Financial services (bank): Finance-Commercial & Savings Banks, Finance-Student Loan, Finance-
Mortgages/Building Societies, Finance-Investment Bank, Finance-Credit Cards, Finance-Development Bank. 
Financial  services (non-bank):  Insurance, Finance-Investment Management, Insurance-Property & Casualty,  
Insurance-Multi-Line, Insurance-Life, Insurance-Brokers, Insurance-Accident & Health, Holding Companies-
Conglomerates, Finance-Leasing Companies, Finance-Brokers & Underwriters, Finance, Holding Companies-
Special Purpose Financial Vehicles, Holding Companies. 
High-tech:  Aerospace & Defence-Aircraft, Chemicals-Fibres, Chemicals-Diversified, Chemicals, Agribusiness-
Agriculture,  Aerospace & Defence-Products & Services, Aerospace  & Defence, Healthcare-Genetics/Research, 
Chemicals-Plastic,  Agribusiness, Services-Management Consulting, Telecommunications-Wireless/Mobile, 
Telecommunications-Telephone,  Telecommunications-Services,  Telecommunications-Satellite, Electronics, 
Telecommunications,  Computers, Services-IT, Healthcare-Products, Computers-Internet, Telecommunications-
Equipment, Computers-Hardware, Healthcare-Medical/Analytical Systems, Computers-Software, Electronics-
Electrical  Equipment, Healthcare-drugs/Pharmaceuticals, Healthcare-Instruments/Surgical Supplies. 
Infrastructure: Transportation-Airport, Transportation-Logistics/Distribution, Construction/Building Products-
Infrastructure. 
Population  services:  Dining & Lodging-Hotels &  Motels,  Healthcare-Nursing  Homes, Automobile-Repair, 
Automobile-Sales, Dining & Lodging, Services-Funeral & Related, Retail-Home Furnishings, Retail-Jewellery  
Stores, Retail-Mail Order & Direct,  Dining & Lodging-Restaurants, Retail-Pharmacy, Healthcare-Professional 
Services/Practices, Retail-Supermarkets, Services, Retail-Department Stores, Services-Advertising/Marketing, 
Retail-Miscellaneous/Diversified, Services-Legal, Services-Personnel, Services-Printing, Services-
Schools/Universities, Services-Security/Protection,  Services-Travel, Telecommunications-Cable Television, 
Telecommunications-Radio/TV Broadcasting,  Services-Accounting, Healthcare-Miscellaneous  Services, 
Healthcare, Healthcare-Hospitals/Clinics, Retail- 
Specialty,  Healthcare-Management Systems,  Retail-Convenience Stores, Healthcare-Outpatient Care/Home 
Care, Leisure  & Recreation, Leisure  & Recreation-Film, Leisure &  Recreation-Gaming, Leisure  & 
Recreation-Services,  Publishing, Publishing-Books, Publishing-Diversified, Publishing-Newspapers, 
Publishing-Periodicals, Retail, Retail-Apparel/Shoe, Retail-Computers & Related, Leisure & Recreation-
Products. 
State: Finance-Export Credit Agencies, Government-Provincial Authority, Government-Local Authority, 
Government-Central Bank, Government-Central Authority, Finance-Multilateral Agencies, Government. 
Traditional  Industry: Air Conditioning and Heating, Forestry  &  Paper, Automobile,  Automobile-
Manufacturers, Automobile-Mobile Homes, Automobile-Parts, Chemicals-Fertilisers, Metal  & Steel-Products, 
Forestry  & Paper-Packaging, Forestry  & Paper-Pulp & Paper, Forestry  & Paper-Raw Materials, Machinery, 
Machinery-Electrical,  Construction/Bldg Prods-Cement/Concrete, Machinery-General Industrial, Food  &  
Beverage-Wholesale Items, Machinery-Material Handling,  Machinery-Printing Trade, Food  & Beverage-
Miscellaneous, Metal &  Steel-Distributors, Machinery-Farm Equipment, Mining,  Mining-Excavation, Oil  & 
Gas-Equipment &  Services, Oil & Gas-Exploration & Development Onshore, Oil & Gas-Exploration & 
Development Offshore, Textile, Textile-Apparel Manufacturing, Textile-Home Furnishings, Textile-Mill 
Products, Textile-Miscellaneous, Metal & Steel, Consumer Products-Footwear, Construction/Bldg  Prods-
Engineering, Construction/Building Prods-Wood Products, Machinery-Machine Tools, Consumer Products-
Cosmetics  & Toiletries, Food & Beverage-Sugar & Refining, Consumer Products-Furniture,  Consumer 
Products-Glass, Consumer Products-Home Improvement, Consumer Products-Miscellaneous, Consumer 
Products-Office Supplies, Consumer Products-Precious Metals/Jewellery, Consumer Products-Rubber, 
Consumer Products-Tobacco, Consumer Products-Tools, Food & Beverage, Food & Beverage-Alcoholic 
 
 23 
Appendix 3 
Table 6 
Descriptive statistics on loan characteristics for sample countries with and without IMF 
assistance between 1993-2001 according to loan purpose 
    With IMF Without IMF 
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drawn 62 306 146 35 650 46 214 137 35.5 621.9 
maturity   2.8 2 0.2 15   3.9 2.5 0.3 12 
Corporate 
Control 
loan size   170.7 230.6 0.2 1100   192.9 154.4 2.4 1050 
drawn 213 257 178 2.4 1275 223 120 94 15 582.8 
maturity   3.2 2.3 0.3 15   4.4 2.2 0.2 10.8 
Capital 
Structure 
loan size   185 361 2.8 6100   128.9 255.1 2.8 3500 
drawn 428 205 138 15 900 189 119 97 10 537.5 
maturity   2.2 2 0.1 30   3.6 2.8 0.2 18 General 
loan size   93.4 122.1 0 1750   95.8 132.7 1.1 2416 
drawn 356 226 161 2.8 870 368 100 77 11 1000 
maturity   3.1 2.3 0.1 16   4.1 1.9 0.1 20 Other 
loan size   101.2 170.4 0.2 2022.1   60 81.2 0 997.1 
drawn 306 210 126.4 7 650 168 154 86 7 431.8 
maturity   8.5 4.5 0.5 20   8.7 3.2 0.3 25 
Project 
Finance 
loan size   140.6 219.9 0.4 2500   150.1 185.5 1 2300 
drawn 186 249 153 20 925 62 185 145 23.5 571.1 
maturity   3.3 2.7 0.3 14.7   4.9 3 0.3 12.1 
Multi 
Purpose 
loan size   148.0 184.3 4.8 1615   145.8 191.2 5 1250 
drawn 22 155 132 10 650 28 80 53 12.5 283.3 
maturity   8.45 3.9 1 12   9.8 3.1 0.5 12 Transport 
loan size   119.7 127.1 13 531   76.9 43.7 28 203.3 
    Note:  Drawn are basis points, Loan size are million US dollars, Maturity year   
    Source:  Authors' calculations from data 
 
Full list of loan purposes contained in each broad grouping  
 
Corporate control: LBO/MBO, Employee stock option plan, Acquisition, Acquisition line.  
Capital structure: Refinancing, Debtor in possession financing, Recapitalisation, Receivable backed  
financing, Debt repayment, Securitisation, Standby/CP support.  
General: General corporate, Private placement, Public finance, Trade financing, Working capital.  
Project: Project financing.  
Property: Mortgage lending, Property.  
Transport: Shipping, Aircraft.  
Other: Spin-off, Empty purpose code.  
Multiple purpose code: More than one purpose for the same loan.  
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Appendix 4 
Table 7 
Correlation Matrixes 
Countries with IMF assistance 
  
Lndraw
n Maturity debtgdp tdstoxgs restogdp st_tdebt invgdp credgdp growth cpi Impexp  
lndrawn 1                       
maturity -0.1237 1                     
debtgdp -0.0173 0.1835 1                   
tdstoxgs 0.1123 0.0041 0.071 1                 
restogdp -0.1318 0.1445 0.327 -0.181 1               
st_tdebt -0.1409 0.0345 0.0776 0.2746 0.0667 1             
invgdp -0.1758 0.1306 -0.0538 -0.1001 0.1931 0.0914 1           
credgdp -0.0703 0.1921 0.5085 0.1967 0.2441 0.2886 0.1854 1         
growth -0.2972 0.0566 -0.0976 -0.0817 -0.0322 0.2568 0.452 0.0581 1       
cpi -0.0316 -0.0622 -0.2153 -0.1354 -0.0251 -0.0513 -0.0982 -0.14 -0.0588 1     
impexp -0.2562 -0.0716 -0.3767 -0.2293 0.2383 0.1141 -0.0544 -0.1932 0.1485 0.1269 1   
                          
Countries without IMF assistance 
 
Lndraw
n Maturity debtgdp tdstoxgs restogdp st_tdebt invgdp credgdp growth cpi Impexp  
lndrawn 1                       
maturity 0.0257 1                     
debtgdp 0.0242 -0.019 1                   
tdstoxgs 0.1506 -0.0338 0.2358 1                 
restogdp -0.0303 0.0052 0.3792 -0.2285 1               
st_tdebt -0.0377 -0.127 0.1173 -0.1748 0.379 1             
invgdp -0.1189 -0.044 -0.2774 -0.7598 0.2766 0.531 1           
credgdp -0.0726 -0.0131 -0.0682 -0.7717 0.3525 0.2409 0.77 1         
growth -0.1867 0.0211 -0.6457 -0.5415 -0.166 0.2039 0.6699 0.4389 1       
cpi 0.1173 0.0466 -0.0722 0.1887 -0.3702 -0.1595 -0.1973 -0.3722 0.0579 1     
impexp -0.0643 -0.027 0.2227 0.3333 -0.0683 0.4097 -0.0734 -0.418 -0.1345 -0.0819 1   
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Appendix 5 
 
Table 8 
Regression results for emerging countries with and without IMF assistance 
  
Emerging countries with IMF 
assistance 
Emerging countries without IMF 
assistance 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P Value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P Value 
Maturity -0.0184 0.0050 0.0000 0.0236 0.0065 0.0000 
Debt to GDP -0.0071 0.0017 0.0000 -0.0060 0.0016 0.0000 
Debt service to export of goods 
and services 0.0012 0.0008 0.1540 0.0123 0.0041 0.0030 
Short term external debt to total 
external debt -0.0050 0.0022 0.0240 0.0083 0.0030 0.0060 
Investment to GDP -0.0106 0.0052 0.0400 0.0056 0.0062 0.3660 
bank credit to GDP -0.0007 0.0017 0.6710 -0.0005 0.0018 0.7720 
Growth rate -0.0378 0.0053 0.0000 -0.0628 0.0081 0.0000 
Sum of imports and exports to 
GDP -0.0049 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0057 0.0015 0.0000 
Inflation -0.0005 0.0002 0.0310 0.0062 0.0032 0.0570 
Constant 6.7289 0.1672 0.0000 4.8034 0.2213 0.0000 
Note:  Number of observations in drawn spread regression for countries with IMF assistance is 1438, for countries without IMF assistance 
is 1030.  F-tests are significant at the 1% level 
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